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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
of the strong case presented against defendant by other evidence. While this
may be the present New York rule, it can be observed that Judge Desmond,
with two other Judges, has maintained that misconduct alone can be enough
for reversal.27 Quoting an 1899 case to the effect that warnings unheeded led
to reversals where dangerous appeals continued to be made to juries,2 8 Judge
Desmond asks, in regard to the Marks case, "[W]hat possible remedy is there
but a reversal? . . . 'How long will you abuse the patience of this court?' "29
Perhaps the judicial climate is changing, and this is a "word to the wise."
IM-EACHMENT OF WITNESS WHO Is DRUG ADDICT
The question and extent of admissibility of expert evidence to show the
effect of drug addiction upon the credibility and competency of a witness is a
subject on which there is conflicting authority in American jurisdictions. "The
view adhered to by the majority of American jurisdictions is that testimony
as to narcotic addiction, or expert testimony as to the effects of such drugs, is
not considered admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness, unless fol-
lowed by testimony tending to show that he was under the influence while
testifying, or when the events to which he testified occurred."8 0 The minority
view holds such evidence generally admissible for impeachment purposes.
Although there are numerous cases dealing with this problem,31 there is a
surprising lack of articulation of the underlying reasons for either exclusion or
admission.
2
The New York Court of Appeals,33 in passing on the question for the
first time, indicated an adherence to what is termed the majority American
view.
In People v. Williams, the defendant was convicted of feloniously selling
a narcotic drug to a person who became the State's chief witness against him.
At the trial, defense counsel arduously sought to attack the credibility of this
witness through his history of prior drug addiction. The witness had been
addicted to the use of heroin for about five years prior to the day of the sale
in question. He had had no drugs on that day, nor during the four months
period prior to the trial. Defense counsel attempted to introduce expert medi-
cal testimony regarding the effects of addiction upon the truthfulness of
addicts. Objections to the introduction of such testimony were sustained by
the Trial Judge, ruling that the witness' credibility was a matter for the jury.
27. Where prosecutor's prejudicial statements on summation warranted reversal
even though the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt, see People v. Swanson,
278 App. Div. 846, 104 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1951).
28. Supra note 13 at 79. The case was People v. Fielding, supra note 26 at 547.
29. Supra note 13 at 79. See People v. Lovello, 1 N.Y.2d 436, 154 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1956),
in which an illegal delay in arraignment, plus "... . serious and prejudicial error . . . made
by the prosecutor in his summation" warranted a reversal. Judge Desmond wrote the
opinion for a unanimous court.
30. Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1955).
31. See cases collected in note 30 supr4z; Annot, 15 A.L.R. 912 (1921).
32. See Note, 33 So. CAlIF. L. REv. 333 (1943).
33. 6 N.Y.2d 18, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1959).
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On appeal, contending such exclusion to be prejudicial error, it was found
that defense counsel's offers of proof via medical testimony were vague and
ambiguous. Therefore, the question of whether expert testimony on the effects
of narcotic addiction upon the perceptive powers of an addict was admissable
was not properly presented on appeal.
34
The appeal was thus limited to the dual question of whether there was
error in the exclusion of medical testimony that addicts are unworthy of
belief, and therefore, the exclusion of testimony that the witness, was unworthy
of belief.
In affirming the Trial Court's exclusion of the latter testimony, the Court
deemed the question of the witness' credibility to be a matter solely for the
jury.
As to the question of whether testimony that narcotic addicts are un-
worthy of belief is admissible for impeachment purposes, the Court indicated
its adherence to the majority American view, holding such testimony to be
properly excludable.
The reasons given for such exclusion were that such testimony is not a
consensus of scientific opinion, and its allowance would obscure the real issues
before the jury, and overdevelop a collateral matter.35 Where the sole witness
is a narcotic addict, cases of the type present here stand or fall on his testi-
mony. If medical evidence were offered, the impact upon the jury would be
very great, and the unwarranted inference, that since he is an addict he is
untruthful, could easily be drawn. Such an inference must be supported by
more than a single opinion.36 There could also be a danger of a battle of
experts on the collateral issue of credibility.
The Court also indicated that the witness could and had been impeached
in the normal manner, as well as having his demeanor subjected to jury
scrutiny.
The dissent felt that the offers of proof by defense counsel were not so
vague as to prevent the Court from answering the question of whether an
expert may testify as to the general effects of drug addiction on mental and
perceptive powers, and that the Trial Court's refusal to allow testimony on
this subject was error.
As to admissibility regarding credibility of the specific witness, the dissent
would adopt the minority view,37 and allow its admission as "having a legiti-
34. The offer of proof must be clear and unambiguous, to enable the reviewing
court to determine what was intended to be adduced by the testimony, and whether an
exclusion of such testimony was prejudicial error. If offers are so made, the party is
entitled to a construction most favorable to himself. See, in this regard, Daniels v.
Paterson, 3 N.Y.2d 47, 163 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1951); 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice 540.
35. State v. King, 88 Minn. 175, 92 N.W. 965 (1903).
36. In regard to a conflict of scientific opinion, see Bishop, The Narcotic Drug
Problem, at 23-24 (1920); Maurer and Vogel, Narcotics and Narcotic Addiction, at 216,
238 (1955 as cited by the Court).
37. See State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. 233 (1916); Effinger v. Effinger,
48 Nev. 205, 228 P. 615 (1924) ; Anderson v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 365, 144 S.W. 281 (1912).
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mate tendency to throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness and sincerity of a
witness."
38
However, several cases relied upon in support of this proposition do not
deal with the specific point involved in the instant case. People v. Webster 9
dealt with the admissibility of evidence of addiction at the time of the events
to which the witness testified-therefore, competency rather than credibility
was in issue. Wilson v. United States40 also dealt with competency, and
whether the witness at the time of testifying was so under the influence of
drugs as to be incompetent. The fact that the dissent seeks support for its
position by relying on scientific authority contrary to the majority position is
merely indicative of the danger of unwarranted inferences being greater where
scientific authority is in disagreement.
It would appear that the majority position propounded here has strong
bases in policy and logic, both because of the factors mentioned above, and
the fact that the traditional modes of impeachment would appear to provide
adequate weapons for counsel to attack the veracity of a witness, e.g. past
addiction, moral character, strenuous cross-examination. The fact that the
jury is the final arbiter of credibility and demeanor is an additional safeguard
of the defendant's rights.
CORROBORATION OF COMPLAINING WITNESS IN SEX CRIMES
A child under twelve years of age is presumed incompetent to be sworn as
a witness in a criminal proceeding, which presumption can be overcome in a
proper preliminary examination. 41 If the child is the complainant and is not
sworn, but testifies, there is a statutory requirement that every material fact
essential to constitute the crime must be corroborated. 42 Where the child is
the complainant, but is sworn, there is no statutory requirement of corrobora-
tion.
43
In People v. Oyola,44 defendant's ten year old daughter was sworn, and
testified to all the particulars of a completed act of intercourse upon her by
her father soon after she retired for the night. Although defendant's wife
returned home only two hours after the alleged act, and the police arrived
only two hours after that, no medical evidence concerning complainant's condi-
tion was submitted at the trial. The jury convicted defendant of impairing
the morals of a minor and of third degree assault.
In People v. Porcaro,45 a companion case, the ten year old complainant
was sworn and testified to having regular and frequent intercourse with her
38. Supra note 33, at 30, 187 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1959).
39. 139 N.Y. 73, 34 N.E. 730 (1893).
40. 232 U.S. 563 (1914).
41. People v. Klein, 266 N.Y. 188, 194 N.E. 402 (1935).
42. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 392; People v. Dutton, 305 N.Y. 632, 11 N.E.2d 889
(1953).
43. Supra note 41.
44. 6 N.Y.2d 259, 189 N.Y.S,2d 203 (1959).
45. 6 N.Y.2d 248, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1959).
